Abstract-Many existing problems in distributed systems can be linked to routing being orthogonal to trust and ignoring the social connectivity. This paper introduces a novel and economical protocol, entitled KarmaNET, which binds any routing protocol with trust to build a trusted social path and create judicious forwarders. This creates incentives for nodes to build good karma, and excises any node that has accumulated too much bad karma. KarmaNET requires only local knowledge, cuts off malicious nodes at the source, adapts to dynamic changes in behavior, bounds the number of unwanted messages a node can generate in its lifetime (even in the presence of collusion, part-time spammers, and errors in marking the outcome), and achieves an expected 0 spams received per node in the limit. KarmaNET ostracizes spammers, freeloaders, and minimizes Sybil attacks with negligible false positive and negative rates (less than 0.5%). We theoretically prove bounds on the damage an attacker can cause, that KarmaNET achieves exponentially fast adaptation to a node's dynamic behavior, and show that our simulation matches the theory.
I. INTRODUCTION & RELATED WORK
Many current distributed systems are designed without considering the social connectivity or trust when delivering messages. This introduces many problems, e.g. the burden for deciding if a message is spam is placed solely on the receiver, nodes can consume resources without contributing any (freeloading), nodes can join and leave the network at will, nodes can create many identities to avoid restrictions, and a node's dynamic behavior is difficult to capture. In this paper we leverage Social Networks (SN) and address a number of such issues: spam, freeloading, Sybil attacks, and dynamic behavior changes. This paper introduces a novel and economical system, entitled KarmaNET, which builds a Trusted Social Path (TSP) and creates judicious forwarders. TSPs tie routing and trust together, choosing a route wherein each edge is trusted and exists in the SN. As edges have Out Of Band (OOB) meaning, e.g. edges could indicate friendships, or participation in a class, attackers cannot create arbitrary edges [1] .
A number of reputation systems have attempted to restrict malicious nodes, but they do not cutoff malicious nodes at its source [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . In KarmaNET, forwarding a bad message causes the node to be punished and forwarding a good message causes the node to be rewarded. Each node uses the trust value of the previous hop to determine whether the risk associated with forwarding is worth the outcome. Nodes become judicious forwarders as they probabilistically drop unwanted messages.
Many reputation [2] , [3] or credit based systems [7] , [4] , [5] , [6] often rely a threshold for trust, above which messages will be always forwarded, and below which messages will always be dropped. Once a node becomes excised it will remain cutoffuntil an external reset is applied, e.g. in [7] every u.S. Government work not protected by u.S. copyright unit of time a node recovers a unit of credit so that a node is not cutoff from communication indefinitely. KarmaNET uses probabilistic dropping so that a node is never indefinitely cutoff from communication, and is given incentive to accumulate good karma to raise its communication success ratio. Using a reset mechanism implies that a malicious node will be able to generate an unbounded number of unwanted messages in its lifetime, in contrast, KarmaNET's probabilistic mechanism is able to bound the number of unwanted messages a node can generate in its lifetime. Importantly, KarmaNET is able to maintain this bound even in the presence of errors in the marking, collusion, and part-time spamming; furthermore, KarmaNET requires that nodes accumulate good karma for every action to avoid becoming excised, e.g. a freeloader which initiates wanted messages will still be excised. We are unaware of any prior system which achieves this.
KarmaNET can be applied to any system wherein one wants to restrict unwanted communication, or route around malicious nodes. In Figure 1 , we compare network traffic with spammers with and without KarmaNET. It is apparent, that by utilizing KarmaNET traffic from malicious nodes (brown nodes) are not forwarded. In the case of freeloaders, a similar graph will result with traffic avoiding the freeloaders, and the freeloaders having few messages on their outbound edges.
We theoretically prove that the number of unwanted messages that a node can generate in its lifetime is bounded, a node can generate an unbounded number of wanted messages in its lifetime, the number of spams received per node goes to 0 in the limit, malicious nodes are cutoff exponentially fast, nodes can recover or lose their reputation in a constant number of successful messages, a node must accumulate good karma for each action, and determine the number of wanted messages a Sybil attacker must forward per unwanted message generated/forwarded. We preform extensive simulations on randomly generated social network graphs, and a subset of the Orkut social network. Our simulations validate our analysis, and show that KarmaNET achieves a negligible false positives (FP)/false negatives (FN) rate « 0.5%) which is comparable to what is accomplished in other spam detection algorithms. Additionally, KarmaNET is able to maintain the FP/FN rate in the presense of collusion or errors in the marking. Figure 2 shows the desirable goals of any trust system. They are: Fl Bounded Spam: A spammer can only send a finite number of unwanted messages in their lifetime. F2 Rehabilitation Time: A node with a low reputation is able to recover its trust in a finite number of positive interactions. A weighs the recent with past behavior. As A -----0, the "recent" interactions grows to include all interactions, and as A -----1 the "recent" interactions shrinks towards only the latest.
II. DESIRABLE SYSTEM PROPERTIES
likelihood that the message that v initiated will be wanted.
In some applications further actions may be desired, e.g. an auction site may also want to track the node's reputation for paying for goods, and KarmaNET allows any number of additional actions to be added. We denote the set of actions byA.
Separating init and f wd prevents a malicious node from cutting off a good node. Without this separation, an attacker can send an abundant number of spams through a victim node (v) causing v 's neighbors trust in v to be lowered. With this separation, the victim's initiating value is unaffected, even though its forwarding value is lowered. We discuss how KarmaNET limits the Sybil attack in Section V-B. Separating rt defends against freeloaders.
When a node u receives a message from a distant node w through a neighboring node v, u does not need to know w's trust value, instead u can determine if it should accept the message using v 's forwarding ability. To represent u 's trust in neighbor v using action a E A , we use:
with m and n representing the recent fraction of wanted/unwanted interactions, and c representing the total number of interactions with v.
To rapidly adapt to node behavior changes, e.g. a node getting infected or recovering from a virus, we utilize the Exponential Moving Average (EMA) [8] :
F3 Unbounded Hams : A node can send an unlimited number of wanted messages. F4 Decimation Time: A trusted node only needs to have a finite number of negative interactions to lower its probability of success to a negligible value. F5 Cutoff Time : The number of messages required for a malicious node to be cutoff from the initial state (when no messages are sent) is exponentially fast. F6 Good Karma: A node must accumulate good karma for each action in order to raise their trust, conversely a node will accumulate bad karma when misbehaving in anyone action and have their reputation lowered. In Figure 2 , (Ji represents a node 's trust after message i, and T represents the initial trust.
FI to F4 are highlighted in Figure 2 in inverted colors. F5 is not highlighted as it is a special case and only happenes at the systems start. F6 is not displayed as it will be discussed in Section III. We theoretically prove that KarmaNET achieves all of these.
III. KARMANET
We now detail the design of KarmaNET architecture. There are three components in KarmaNET: 1) trust management, 2) probabilistic forwarding, and 3) routing tied with trust. We detail these in tum , and then give an example.
A. Trust Management
KarmaNET makes use of the social network, requmng nodes to only track the trust of their immediate neighbors. That is, KarmaNET requires only local knowledge. This enables a node to determine the probability that the next interaction will be desirable.
To create an accurate judicious forwarder, the node must be able to determine the class of the node, e.g. spam initiator, spam forwarder, freeloader, good node, etcetera. To accomplish this KarmaNET tracks the node's trust for each action. KarmaNET defines three actions, we present these from u's point of view when considering neighbor v: 1) rt:
The likelihood that v will successfully route u's message to the destination u intended, 2) f w d: The likelihood that the message that v is f orw arding will be wanted, and 3) init: The
ham/spam attempts -; 00 .... We give an example of this propagation in Section III-D.
We use 0 = 0 for an unwanted message and 0 = 1 for a wanted message , but any 0 :::; 0 :::; 1 can be used allowing a node to clarify its degree of satisfaction of the interaction . For example , a node which receives a link set from a search engine may only find 90% of the links useful, and can inform the search engine of this by setting 0 = 0.9.
B. Probabilistic Forwarding
KannaNET turns every node into a judicious forwarder, i.e. each node will only forward messages which are likely wanted by the destination. This is accomplished in a probabilistic manner, tying the forwarding probability to the probability the next interaction will be desired (Equation (3)).
Highly trusted nodes will have 0"~1, but with long path lengths the probability of dropping can be non-negligible. Therefore, to bias towards success for good nodes , KannaNET utilizes T in deciding the probability with which to forward the message :
This means whenever the expectation that the next outcome is desired is larger than T the message will always be forwarded ; otherwise the message will be probabilistically dropped . Some papers have recommended that a determin istic dropping mechanism be used, i.e, if O"(T~(v)) < T then the message will be dropped with probability 1. The problem of such schemes is that there must exist an OOB communication mechanism. For example if u gets infected by a virus and sends many messages through v, then v will stop forwarding u's messages . However, once u removes the virus u must communicate with v to reset v' s trust which can no longer be done in the network . Using a probabilistic scheme ensures that u will be able to recover its reputation given enough time.
In Equation (5), a node must compose the various trust values to create a representative a. We note the only composition function that achieves cutting off malicious nodes is to take the minimum of the trust values. By taking the minimum a node must be actively routing messages for other nodes, be judiciously forwarding messages from its neighbors, and be initiating messages that are desired . Any node which fails to In order to determine the probability the next interaction will be desired given T~(v), a node uses:
where~> 0 is able to control the number of spams that can be generated in a node's lifetime, >.. is again used for rapidly cutting off a malicious node, T denotes the node 's initial trustworthiness (0"( (0,0,0))), and the required reputation it must maintain to avoid being cutoff. m' and n' are given by:
Using p in this way allows an omitting factor. That is, a small number of wanted/unwanted messages will not blemish a node 's otherwise spotless record . p allows KarmaNET to prevent partial spammers, collusion , and ignore a nonzero error rate. It also guarantees these attackers will have a bounded number of unwanted interactions, as long as p is larger than the fraction of good interactions that the attacker executes, the attacker will always be ostracized. One can even allow p = T, which indicates any node which has a good interaction fraction less than T will become cutoff, and have a bounded number of unwanted interactions. The only downside being that the bound of unwanted messages grows proportionally with p (this is discussed in detail in Theorem 1).
Equation (3) has two important implications: (1) as time goes to 00 a malicious node has an exponentially decreasing probability of success, (2) at any time a node can rehabilitate themselves (albeit with effort exponential in the number of previous bad interactions).
The final component of KarmaNET's trust management deals with updating the trust values when an interaction occurs. To push the probabilistic dropping to the source KarmaNET sends an outcome (0) from the destination to the source (when the message succeeded), and from the source towards the destination (when the message is dropped) . As the punishment is equal across all forwarders and the initiator, the risk is being equally distributed amongst the path. This creates a strong incentive for all nodes to judiciously forward messages , as they are vouching that the destination will want the message . 
Pfwd = {~(T~(V))
If O"(T~(v)) > T Otherwise(5)
C. Routing
Finally, we consider the problem of building a TSP given a trust management system. KarmaNET does not tie itself to a particular routing algorithm, but instead ties into any existing algorithm which allows determination of the distance to a destination through a neighbor, e.g. RIP, OSPF, or response time for a query. Note, that in a directed routing protocol, e.g. Distributed Hash Table ( DHT), KarmaNET will route around malicious nodes, but will not necessarily excise them. For the remainder we assume that messages can flow in any direction.
Let 8(u, v) denote the distance from neighbor u to the destination v as given by the routing algorithm, D( u) denote the degree of node u, and N(i) denote the set of neighbors of i. KarmaNET uses (at node i):
as the routing algorithm. Where 8, and iJ denotes normalization of the value using the neighbor set N(i). It has been wellstudied that a random walk in a social network has a much higher probability of success when one chooses neighbors probabilistically based upon their degree. If one neglects taking into account the degree the probability of being stuck, i.e, arriving at a node where every neighbor has previously been visited, is much larger [9] . a, (3 , and 1 allow customization of the importance of path length, trustworthiness, and prevention of being stuck to any particular applications needs.
D. Example Propagation
As an example consider Figure 3 wherein A is attempting to send a message to C through B, the solid lines denote the connections in the social network, and the dashed arrows denote the trust values. There are a few important notes: 1) Every attempt (even if unsuccessful) has c incremented, 2) A node which forwards an unwanted message to the destination still gets its rt rewarded, and 3) All items are rewarded on a successful sending of a wanted message. Here it can be seen that having c as a separate component (in contrast to [2] , [3] ), allows modification of the trust state without needing the receiver's opinion, and is essential in bounding the number of spams that a node can send.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section we will analyze system properties. Due to limited space, we will only provide proof sketches for Fl (Section II) and will not discuss the rest. See [10] for the remaining proofs.
Theorem 1: The number of unwanted messages a node can successfully send in its lifetime is bounded by
Proof First, note that the probability of success is given by (J, therefore by summing (J for all time one obtains the number of messages that can possibly be sent. We can approximate this infinite sum using the Euler-Maclaurin formula:
La(m=O,n,c)~[ a(O,n,c)dc c=o io
It is safe to assume m < p for some point in time after a bad node sends many spams. Therefore we set m = 0 Next, taking the limit as N ---+ 00 yields the desired result.
•
As an example, with E = 0.01,'\ = 0.01, n 2: 0.9 and 0 < T < 1 this yields that a spammer can send at most 106 unwanted messages for each edge. Corollary 1: As time ---+ 00 the expected number of spams received per node goes to O.
Proof This follows immediately from Theorem 1.
V. SECURITY PROPERTIES A. Misbehaving Nodes
There are two classes of simple misbehaving nodes: 1) spammers, and 2) freeloaders In both cases, the outcome will be propagated towards the offender, which will cause init for the spammers and rt for the freeloader to be lowered excising the offending nodes. In the presence of collusion or a nonzero error rate in marking offenders, the spammer/freeloader becomes a part-time attacker, i.e, their m value is nonzero. However, if p is larger than the fraction of the good messages they sent, part-time attackers will still be excised.
B. Sybil Attack
As in [1], we assume a Sybil attacker maintains a constant number of edges out of the Sybil subnetwork.
First, note that a Sybil subnetwork must not initiate spam from their periphery (those nodes that connect the subnetwork with nodes not under control of the Sybil attacker). If the Sybil subnetwork allows spams to be initiated from the periphery, then the periphery's trust will be lowered and messages from within the Sybil subnetwork will be unable to leave. It immediately follows that executing a Sybil attack provides no benefit for a freeloader, as the periphery will be punished and, again, will cause the entire Sybil subnetwork to become cutoff.
Theorem 2: A Sybil subnetwork which only forwards spams from inside of the subnetwork must ensure that 1 1 1
Due to space limitations, we omit the full proof (see [10] ).
Using ,\ = e= 0.01, a = 0.45, (3 = 0.5, 1 = 0.05, we obtain that a Sybil attacker must forward about 2.23 good messages for each bad message it generates using its Sybil identity.
C. Slenderization Attack A malicious node can attempt to excise a good node via two mechanisms: (1) sending spams through the node, (2) reporting false outcomes. In the former, the attacker can only cause fwd (not init) to be lowered. This results in the victim being unable to forward the attacker's spams, but the victim's init is unaffected, and the victim is still able to successfully initiate messages. In the latter, the sending node has complete First, we show how varying the number of spammers affects KarmaNET, Figure 4 . Despite the fraction of attackers increasing to 50% the good nodes are unaffected, while the attackers are excised. c: Figure 5 , we consider how varying the error rate (ERR) affects KarmaNET. Again, changing the error rate has no effect on the good nodes, while the spammers success rate increases proportionally with the error rate. However, by setting p = ERR, KarmaNET is able to excise the spammers, despite the spammers posessing a nonzero positive interactions.
Next in

D. Modifying The Outcome
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [11] can be used to prevent outcome modification, e.g changing a negative outcome into a positive or vice-versa. The basic concept is as follows. If the initiator knows the "identity", e.g. email address, file being shared, etc., then the initiator can generate a unique public/private key-pair. The initiator then sends the public key and the message in plaintext, and encrypts the private key with the "identity" of the destination. As the message flows, each node on the path can record the public key. When the destination wishes to report the outcome, it simply signs it with the private key.
E. Dropping The Outcome
When a message is dropped, the source will timeout and punish the route (lowers rt) up to the point where the message was dropped. Therefore, if a node drops the outcome it is treated as if it were a freeloader, and it will become excised.
control over whom it communicates with, and can simply avoid communicating with a node which reports fraudulent outcomes.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate KarmaNET, we use two network models: 1) a randomly generated small world network using the HolmesKim nodel (HK) [12] , and 2) a subset of the Orkut graph collected in [13] . In both cases the netowk size is kept constant at N = 50, 000. We utilize the paramaters 0: = 0.45, j3 = 0.5, "y = 0.05, ,\ = e= 0.01, and unless otherwise noted T = 0.5 and p = 0.03 (see [10] ). We display all graphs using the mean of 5 runs. In all cases, unless otherwise noted by "Orkut" a HK network is used. Next in Figure 6 , we consider how KarmaNET handles varying the freeloading percent. Again, those freeloaders with degree < 50 have a higher probability of success as their betweenness is very low, and KarmaNET actively routes around them. The freeloaders with degree > 50 have a lower success rate, as they are more likely initially used for routing. In all cases, there is negligible difference between the Orkut subset, and the generated HK graphs. The maximum number of spams allowed to send by a spammer during its lifetime. Also shown is the expected number of spams received per node with the fraction of spammers being 10%,30%, 50%. As t -t 00, the number of spams sent will approach 106, and the expected number of spams received will approach O.
In Figure 7 , we shoe the expected number of spams that a node can generate, in correlation to the expected number of spams received per node. From the analysis we expect that the malicious node can generate approximately 106 spams, and our simulation shows an exponential decay in the number of successful spams sent. Further, as the spammers have exponentially decreasing probabilities of success, the expected number of spams received per node decreases to 0 (in line with our analysis). Figure 8 shows the network evolution with three classes of nodes: (1) spammers, (2) flippers, and (3) good nodes. The flippers initially send wanted messages, but at time 17 they begin to send spam. Finally, at time 33 the begin to send wanted messages again. The good nodes constantly maintain a high success rate, while the spammers maintain a negligible success rate. The flippers initially have a high success rate, but once they start sending spam their success rate rapidly drops. Then, when they begin sending wanted messages their success rate rapidly climbs towards the good success rate.
In Figure 9 , we show the probability of success for good and Sybil spammers nodes when 10% of nodes in the network are Sybil nodes who use fake identity to send spams. As expected, the high degree Sybil attack benefits from high betweenness with high volumn of traffic going through them. Therefore the high degree Sybil nodes can send more unwanted messages and have a higher probability of success whereas the low degree Sybil attack has low probability of success. Our simulation matches our previous analysis that Sybil spammers nodes who send more than I unwanted message out of 2.23 good ones have low trust value and will be cutoff Fig. 9 . Probability of success when a fraction of network are Sybil nodes who send spams using fake identities.
VII . CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This paper introduced a novel and economical protocol, called KarmaNET, which builds a TSP and creates judicious forwarders. KarmaNET excises spammers and freeloaders exponentially fast even under the presence of collusion, part-time spamming, or a nonzero error rate. KarmaNET is able to bound the number of unwanted messages a node can generate in its lifetime, and therefore ensure that in the limit the expected number of spams received per node goes to O. KarmaNET is able to dynamically adapt to changes in a node's behavior and allows system parameter customization to shape the rate of cutoff for bad nodes and control the error rate tolerated. We are in the process of implementing the full version of KarmaNET in Facebook and other live systems. 
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